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develop the leased tract. It can hardly be denied that in this
instance the lessee was aware that it was depleting the reserves
underlying the leased tract. Protection from liability could have
been achieved by compliance with the obligations of the lease
contract. It seems inconsistent with civilian ideas of fault as a
basis of recovery to state that the lessee was in need of notice
of its transgression.
The practical effect of this decision is to make it incumbent
on every lessor not only to seek production data concerning wells
on his own land, but to procure the geological information
available concerning surrounding tracts of land on which his
lessee drills. True, such a burden may exist in any similar situation in which a third party leases the adjoining tract. However,
it may be noted that in such an instance, it is more than likely
that the lessee of the undeveloped tract would be diligent in
operating his lease because drainage by a third party injures
not only his lessor but himself as well. Where, however, the
lessee of the undeveloped tract controls both leases, such is not
the case, and it seems that the imposition of this burden on the
landowner, who is usually in a vastly inferior economic position,
is somewhat unreasonable.
George W. Hardy, III
REAL ACTIONS - THE ACTION TO ESTABLISH TITLE
BURDEN OF PROOF WHEN NEITHER PARTY
IS IN POSSESSION

-

Prior to 1908, there were three main real actions' in Louisiana law -the petitory, possessory, and jactitory actions. The
selection of the proper action depended on the rights asserted by
the plaintiff as well as the factual situation. When ownership
was at issue and the individual out of possession was asserting
his ownership rights against the one in possession, the petitory
action lay. 2 When possession was at issue, the possessory or
1. Article 4 of the Louisiana Code of Practice defines a real action as "that
which relates to claims made on immovable property, or to the immovable rights
to which they are subjected. The object of this action is the ownership or the
possession of such property; and they are therefore subdivided into petitory and
possessory actions."
Article 41 states: "A real action lies against him who, without having contracted any obligations toward the plaintiff, is nevertheless bound towards him,
as possessor of the immovable property of which that plaintiff claims the ownership or the possession, or on which he claims to exercise some immovable right."
2. "The petitory action is that by which he who has the property of a real
estate, or of a right upon or growing out of it, proceeds against the person having
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jactitory action, lay, depending on. the circumstances. 8 The pos
sessory action could, be brought by one who had been in. posses-.
sion for more than one year, and had been actually, or corporeally, disturbed in.his possession. 4 On the other hand, the jactitory,
action, was available to one in possession, who had suffered, a.

legal or fictitious disturbance.5
The only- situation not covered by one of these three actions
was that in which none of the claimants were in possession of'

the property. Prior to 1908, the petitory and jactitory actions
the.possession, in order, to obtain the .possession,of: the.immovable property, or, the.
enjoyment of,the rights upon. it, to which- he is entitled." LA. CODE, OF .PRACTICE.
art. 5' (1870).
3. "A possessory action is that by which one claims, to be, maintained, in. the
possession of an immovable property, or of a right upon or growing out of it, when
he. has- been disturbed; or to. be reinstated- to. that possession, when he- has been
divested or evicted." LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 6 (1870).
"The possessory. action, which is a branch ofireal actions, may.be-brought by.
any possessor- of a' real estate, or of a real.right, who is disturbed either in the
possession of the estate or in the enjoyment of the right, against. him who causes.
the disturbance, in order to be maintained in, or restored to the-possession, whetherhe has been evicted' or disturbed; provided' his. possession be accompanied' by the
qualifications hereafter required." LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 46- (1870).
Under, French law, CODE. DE PROCItAURE CIVILE arts. 23-27 (1806), fron.which.
Louisiana's possessory, action is taken, the possessory action was.broad enough to
embrace a disturbance in fact or a.disturbance in law.. However, Article.52 of the.
Louisiana Code of'Practice, covering the disturbance in law, was so confusing that
it made it, impossible to follow French law on the possessory action where there
was a disturbance in law. Instead, Louisiana took the jactitory action from Spanish law to cover the situation where there was a disturbance in law. Under Spanish
law, the jactitory action lay to prevent defamation of person or, property, whether,
movable or immovable. See Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart. (O.S.) 656; 713' (La.
1821) : "The law,. par..3, .tit. 2, 1. 46, declares that no person can be compelled'.to
bring suit, except in particular cases, wherein the judge may,, by law,,oblige him
to do it; as when a man publicly says,, that, another is his slave, etc. in these and
like cases, the person injured may petition the judge.to oblige the defamer to bring.
suit, and prove what he has said, or to retract, or to make such reparation as,the
judge shall deem just; if he refuses to bring, the suit, the party aggrieved shall be
for ever absolved from the charge made against him. This law applies, according.
to the Spanish authority, to defamation respecting property, as well as person,
and that, whether it be movable or immovable: Gregorio Lopez, on the above-cited
law, n. 2. Elizondo Practico Universal, vol. 2;,p. 136." We have limited the Spanish action to protect possession, where there is a defamation or disturbance in law
of real property.
4. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 49' (1870) sets forth the essentials necessary to
bring the possessory action. While the article requires the real and actual possession of the property when the disturbance occurs, our courts have not interpreted the article literally in requiring an actual possession. They have held that
civil possession is sufficient, provided it has been preceded by actual physical possession. See Ciaccio v. Hartman, 170 La. 949, 129 So. 540 (1930) ; Industrial
Lumber Co. v. Farque, 162 La. 793, 111 So. 166 (1927) ; Chamberlain v. Abadie,
48 La. Ann. 587, 19 So. 574 (1896) ;.Searles v. Costillo, 12 La. Ann. 203 (1857) ;
Ellis v. Prevost, 19 La. 251 (1841). See also Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. Baldwin Lumber Co., 126' La. 347, 52 So. 537 (1910), and cases cited therein.
5. See Bell v. Saunders, 139 La. 1037, 72 So. 727 (1916) ; Dalton v. Wickliffe,
35 La. Ann. 355 (1883),; Short v. Trustees, 11 La. Ann. 174 (1856) ; Millaudon
v. McDonough, 18 La. 102 (1841); Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart..(O;S.) 656'
(La. 1821).
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were relied upon in these circumstances, but neither proved
satisfactory. 7 If plaintiff brought the petitory action, he had the
burden of proving a valid title.8 He would lose his case if he
could not prove his valid title, even though his title was better
than that of his opponent and even though neither of them was
in possession. Often, to avoid bearing the burden of proof, plain-

tiff would bring the jactitory action.9 If defendant neglected
timely to challenge plaintiff's possession but challenged plain-

tiff's claim, defendant would then bear the burden of proving
that his was a valid title.'0 Like the plaintiff in the petitory
action, defendant in the jactitory action would lose his case if he
could not prove a valid title, even though his title was better than

that of his opponent.
Act 38 of 1908 obviously was passed in an attempt to alleviate
the inequities existing in this situation and in order to resolve
the hiatus existing in the law." The act, now Louisiana Revised
Statutes 13:5062, provides:
6. Poland v. Dreyfous, 48 La. Ann. 83, 18 So. 906 (1896) ; Remick v. Lang,
47 La. Ann. 914, 17 So. 461 (1895) ; McConnell v. Ory, 46 La. Ann. 564, 15 So.
424 (1894) ; Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 355 (1883) ; Griffon v. Blanc, 12
La. Ann. 5 (1857) ; Short v. Trustees, 11 La. Ann. 174 (1856) ; Millaudon v.
McDonough, 18 La. 102 (1841) ; Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart.(O.S.) 656 (La.
1821).
7. What constitutes adequate possession is a substantive question which varies
with each type of land according to its usage. Ciaccio v. Hartman, 170 La. 949,
129 So. 540 (1930) ; Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. Baldwin Lumber Co., 126 La.
347, 52 So. 537 (1910) ; Chamberlain v. Abadie, 48 La. Ann. 587, 19 So. 574
(1896) ; Ellis v. Prevost, 19 La. 251 (1841). Where the issue of possession was
tenuous, the plaintiff could obtain a tactical advantage in choosing his action. If
the defendant neglected to challenge plaintiff on the issue of possession or simply
bore the burden of proof by virtue of the nature of the action, the plaintiff would
have obtained an advantage without the court's ever having been called upon to
decide the issue of possession.
8. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 44 (1870) states: "The plaintiff in an action of
revendication must make out his ttile, otherwise the possessor, whoever he be, shall
be discharged from the demand." In Rowson v. Barbe, 51 La. Ann. 347, 350. 25
So. 139, 140 (1899), the court stated: "It is a principle of law, so familiar as to
have become trite, that a plaintiff in a petitory action must recover upon the
strength of his own title, not upon the weakness of that of his adversary."
9. A vivid example of this is seen in Griffon v. Blanc, 12 La. Ann. 5 (1857),
where the plaintiff tried to escape bearing the burden of proof by bringing the
action in jactitation. In deciding the question as to who would bear the burden
of proof, the court stated: "[Wihere the defendant is himself actually in possession, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to change his position with the form of
action and escape the burden imposed upon him by Art. 44 of the Code of Practice. In order to recover and turn his adversary out of possession, he must establish his title." Id. at 6.
10. See Remick v. Lang, 47 La. Ann. 914, 17 So. 461 (1895) ; Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 355 (1883) ; Short v. Trustees, 11 La. Ann. 174 (1856) ; Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart.(O.S.) 656 (La. 1821).
11. See MCMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 256, n. 15.1 (Supp. 1956) : "This
statute apparently contemplates that the court will weigh the competing claims of
ownership of the parties; and that the plaintiff has only the burden of proving a
better title than defendant .... The reason why such a heavy burden of proving

19581

NOTES

"Action to establish title when neither claimant in possession. In all cases where two or more persons lay claim to
land by recorded title and where neither of the claimants are
in the actual possession of the land so claimed, either of the
claimants may bring suit against one or all the adverse claimants, and for that purpose may join one or more adverse
claimants in the same suit as defendants, to have the titles
to the land adjudicated upon by the court having jurisdiction
of the property. It shall not be necessary for the plaintiff
to allege or prove possession in himself or the defendants.
This action shall be known as the action to establish title to
real estate. The judge shall decide which of the claimants
are the owners of the land in dispute, provided such judgment shall in no case be res judicata as to persons not made
parties to the suit."
Under virtually every system of law, the lawful possessor is
entitled to remain in possession until the lawful owner proves his
ownership. 12 Thus, possession becomes the arbiter of the burden
of proof. This is clearly the criterion which governs the imposition of the burden of proof in our petitory, possessory, and jactitory actions. Under these actions, the claimant disturbing one
in possession or asserting his ownership rights against one in
possession must carry the burden of proof. Under the action to
establish title, since neither party is in possession, no necessity
exists for the plaintiff to carry the burden of proving a valid
title.
The Supreme Court, following the enactment of the 1908 act,
took the view that the plaintiff in the action to establish title had
a valid title is visited upon the plaintiff in a petitory action is because the defendant admittedly has the legal possession of the property. In the action to
establish title admittedly neither party is in possession, and there is not the same
necessity for imposing the heavy burden of proof upon plaintiff as in the petitory
action."
12. The following statement is made in 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, TnE HISTORY

ENGLISH LAW 29 (2d ed. 1899) : "In the history of our law there is no idea
more cardinal than that of seisin. Even in the law of the present day it plays a
part which must be studied by every lawyer; but in the past it was so important
that we may almost say that the whole system of our land law was law about
seisin and its consequences. Seisin is possession." Id. at 49: "In order to give an
adequate protection to ownership, it has been found necessary to protect possession. To prove ownership is difficult, to prove possession comparatively easy."
Roman law had maintained that "property or ownership is, roughly, title:
OF

possession is, roughly, actual enjoyment . . . . Their absolute distinctness is
brought out . . . in the rule which . . . was maintained to the last in Roman

law, that where possession was the matter in issue, title was immaterial: the
defendant could not set it up in defence. Ownership being thus clearly conceived,
the Romans saw no difficulty in proof of it." BUCKLAND & MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW
AND COMMON LAW 62 (1952).
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only; the burden of' proving a better- title than the, defendant in
order' to" win. 18 However, the trend of later cases- has been. to
impose on. the- plaintiff as great. a burden of proof as- he -would
bear in a. petitory, action, that is, the burden of proving a-valid
title in himself.14 The .confusion of the action to. establish title
with the petitory action, has' beclouded: the evident', purpose. of
Act'. 38 of 1908 - to relieve the.claimant, of having, to bear' as
great, a) burden of proof when his, adversary isnot in possession
aszwhen the. adversary is in possession of the property in questioni. Otherwisej if, the-burden of proof were to remain the same
asthat required. of' the~plaintiff in' a-petitory action, it is' difficult
to see. what. practical: purpose:. the' act has!. served. Should. the
court: have- occasion to: re-examine its position regarding. this
matter,. it'is suggested. that,the act be. considered. ini the light of
its original purpose.
Patsy Jb M6Dowell:
TORTS -NJRY'

WHILE SPORT FISHING -.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR,

Plaintiff-was-injured by a lure: cast, by' defendant while both
parties, were- fishing from' a. boat. In a- suit. against; defendant:
and his: liability insurer the:plaintiff! alleged negligence: in speci.,
fied. respects. Defendant denied negligence- and, pleaded, in the'
alternative7 that,.plaintiff had assumed the risks: incident-to the
sport. The testimony of both parties was equally unilluminating.
Plaintiff testified that he did not know what had happened, had
seen, nothing, and defendant testified that he knew only that he.
had. made. an. overhand- cast-and, feeling an. obstruction, turned.
tosee.the hooks lodged' in.plaintiff's cheek. In denying recovery
for negligence, the trial court. held- that plaintiff had failed to
prove his case with the required certainty.' On appeal, plaintiff
conceded, this failure but urged that recovery was nevertheless
in order under the doctrine of' res ipsa loquitur. The court of.
13: See the expressions of the court in support of this view: Metcalfe v. Green,
140 La; 950, 74 So. 261 (1916) ; Baltimore v. Lutcher, 135 La. 873i 66 So. 253
('1914)';
Quaker Realty Co. Praying for Confirmation of Title, 10 Orl. App: 79
(La. App.' 1914) . See also Doiron v. Vacuum Oil Co., 164 La. 15, 113 So. 748
(1927) ; Ellis v. Louisiana Planting Co., 146 La. 652, 83 So. 885 (1920).
14. See Albritton v. Childers, 225. La. 900, 74 So.2d 156, (1954) ; Stockstill' v;
Choctaw Towing'Corp., 224 La. 473, 70 So.2d 93 (1953) ; Dugas v. Powell, 197
La. 409, 1 So.2d 677 (1941).
1. Plaintiff' recovered $154,65, covering medical and. hospital expenses due
under policy provisions establishing compensation for injury- to another, resulting
from insured's activities.

